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WIDOW'S AND CHILDREN'S EXEMPTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA*
A. J. White Hutton*
This topic presents an interesting field of research to ascertain the appropriate
principles of law and just how, through the judicial process, the statutes have been
emnendated, interpreted and interpolated. It is a trite observation that a statute
cannot be understood finally until it has been explained and expounded by the
courts and although some of the results of judicial reasoning may be startling,
yet:
the statute in question must be read, followed and understood in the light
of the judicial exposition.
Moreover, after the interpretation has been made and legislatures following
have made no changes, then the further judicial conclusion is that the legislature
by its silence has acquiesced in the court's interpretation. On this very point
SIMPSON, J.,in Bickley's Estate, 270 Pa. 101 (1921) 113 A. 68, referring to
a .ertain interpretation of the Charities Act of 1855, and although not agreeing
with that particular interpretation, nevertheless was constrained to observe:
"Despite the cogent reasons we have thus given, and our belief
that the policy of the law as expressed in the Act of 1855 is a
wise one, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, because, since
Schultz's App., 80 Pa. 396, was decided on January 31, 1876,
twenty-five legislatures have met and adjourned without passing
an amendatory act to correct the law as there stated, and because
also, as previously said, the doctrine of that case prevails in nearly
all other jurisdictions where like questions have arisen, it has become so established as a guide to the handling of property that
any abandonment or alteration of the understood rule should be
by those fixed with the responsibility of making the law, and not
by us, whose only duty is to define and construe it. We are therefore driven by stare decisis to affirm this decree, recognizing with
Lord Coke 'that the known certaintie of the law is the safetie of
*This article is an abridgement of the above topic discussed in Chapter IX of A TREATISE
ON11THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES IN PENNSYLVANIA by the writer, now in course
of preparation and shortly to be published. In the published work other interesting features on
thi ; topic are discussed.
**A.B., Gettysburg College, 1897; A.M., Gettysburg College, 1899; L.L.B., Harvard University, 1902; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1902- ; Member of Pennsylvania
House of Representatives, 1931-1935. Author of Hutton on WILLS IN PENNSYLVANIA.
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all, and to leave to future legislatures to take such curative action
in regard to the matters as to them shall seem wise'."
In the course of the present article several interesting examples of this form
of judicial legislation will be shown.
GENERAL REMARKS

By statutory enactment in most of the states of the Union, upon the death
of the husband a portion of his -estate may be awarded for the immediate support
of the widow and children. This portion is called the widow's allowance or
under our Pennsylvania law the widow's exemption, in analogy to the debtor's
exemption under the Act of 1849. The exemption under the laws of some states
consists of a certain quantity of provisions and a certain amount of property
up to a limited value as may be fixed either by statute or by the probate court.
Generally the allowance or exemption takes precedence over all debts and charges
against the estate with certain exceptions to be noted hereafter. Some have
essayed to trace the widow's allowance to the widow's quarantine at common
law, described in 2 Blackstone 135, wherein it is stated that the widow shall remain in her husband's capital mansion house for forty days after his death
during which time her dower in the lands of which her husband died seised
shall be assigned. Said the Commentator:
"These forty days are called the widow's quarantine, a term made
use of in law to signify the number of forty days whether applied
to this occasion or any other."
This right of the widow was provided in Magna Charta and has been variously followed in the states of this country.
Tiffany on Real Property, 471.
However, as stated in Acor's Estate, 29 L. 1. 398 (1865), per CHAPMAN,
P. J., a widow's right at common law to the quarantine period has no relation to
the support of the widow and family out of the personal estate of the deceased
husband and known as the widow's allowance or exemption. In this case it
is questioned whether the widow's quarantine ever existed in Pennsylvania. Be
that as it may, nevertheless the widow's quarantine is the only analogy which
may be found as a base or origin of the present widow's exemption law in Pennsylvania, howbeit this is now completely governed by statutory enactment.
Viewing the matter in 1871 when he published his learned work on the
Intesiate System of Pennsylvania, Scott, page 61, said:
"In common honesty the acquisitions of the debtor belong to the
creditor. But the demands of necessity and humanity are sometimes so imperative as to overbear questions of mum and tuum.
The laws which exempt from execution articles necessary for the
enjoyment of life, like those which oblige communities to provide
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for persons who are unable to provide for themselves, rest upon this
foundation. The law of our being, the nature of our climate, and
our habits of life, render certain articles so indispensable to existence as intelligent beings, that the legislature have exempted them
from execution, or, in the case of decedents, have secured them from
the claims of creditors. In doing this they may have disregarded
the claims of severe ard exacting justice, but they certainly, at the
same time, acted in obedience to the higher obligations of humanity
and necessity. This was done, not that the recipient of this humane
bounty might expend the proceeds for the gratification of desires
which had no claim upon the humanity or the sympathies of the
public; but, in order that the sum thus secured might be 'retained'
and 'remain for the use of the widow and family.' Every attempt
to convert this benevolent provision for the comfort of the widow
and family into a claim for money, which may be expended without
promoting that object, should be discountenanced as a perversion of

those statutory provisions and safeguards we are now about to consider."
STATUTORY SOURCES

Scott, supra, refers to several early statutory enactments on this subject, particularly the Act of March 26, 1814, the Act of April 10, 1823, the 4th section
of the Act of February 24th, 1834, the Act of April 26, 1850, and the Act of
April 14, 1851.
In Reiff's Appeal, 2 Pa. 256 (1845), ROGERS, J., remarked:

"Whenever there is reason to believe that the estate of a deceased
person is insufficient to pay his debts, exclusive of such articles as
may be by law exempted from levy and sale, upon an execution
against a debtor, it is the duty of the administrator or executor to
keep a distinct and separate account of all such articles so exempted,
and to suffer the same to remain for the use of the widow and children, in residing with the deceased at the time of his death; sect. 4,
act of Feb. 24, 1834."
The present law is found in Section 12 of the Fiduciaries Act of June 7,
1917, P. L. 447, 20 PS 471 and following.
SECTION 12

(a)

As explained by the draftsmen of this clause, it is founded on Section 5 of
the Act of April 14, 1851, P. L. 612, as amended by the Act of July 21, 1913,

P. L. 877, and the salient features are that every widow of any decedent dying
-esIfate or intestate within this Commonwealth, or dying outside of this Commonwealth, but whose estate is settled in this Commonwealth may retain or claim
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either real or personal property or the proceeds of either real or personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased husband to the value of $500. Likewise, if there is no widow competent to take, then the exemption right is accorded
to the "children forming part of the family" of the decedent. The right of the
widow is on tht assumption that she is legally the widow of the decedent and in
addition thereto was maintaining the family relationship with her husband at the
time of is decease, or in the absence of this fact, failure so to maintain was not
due to her assent or her fault.
It is tht duty of the executor or administrator of the decedent to have
appraised and set apart to the widow the personal property which she may select,
but if cash is selected then no appraisement is necessary. The selection may be
made from any form of personal property, including cash, or it may be made out
of the real estate or the proceeds from the sale of real estate. Although the
exemption right is derived from the debtor's exemption analogy, as set forth
in the Act of 1849, nevertheless the right of exemption to the widow or children
of a decedent does not depend upon the solvency of the estate or upon the actual
economic necessities of the recipients. A widow may claim her exemption out
of the estate of her deceased husband to the detriment of creditors whose claims
by reason thereof cannot be paid, and it would make no difference if the widow
had a separate estate of ample extent.
In Crawford's Estate, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 222 (1923), the court observed
per PORTER, J., that the Fiduciaries Act was a codification of earlier statutes and
while. it does not in Section 12 follow literally the Act of April 14, 1851, P. L.
612, the provisions are substantially the same.
FAMILY RELATIONSHIP

Assuming there has been a lawful marriage and the widow is the lawful
widow of the decedent, nevertheless she may not be entitled to the exemption
because at the time of the death of her husband the family relationship was not
being maintained; in short, the claimant was not living with her husband. About
two years after the passage of the Act of 1851, the case of Spier's Appeal, 26 Pa.
233 (1856), arose, the facts being that the intestate died on the 10th day of
June, 1853, leaving a widow, Anna M. F. Spier, who at the time of his death
was living in Germany. Spier had been in this country about five years and a
short time before his death he had written to his wife to join him in this country
which she promised by letter to do. Before this was accomplished Spier died
and his property was taken possession of by an administrator and converted into
cash, after which Mrs. Spier arrived in this country and before the Auditor
claimed the exemption of $300 under the Act of 1851. The claim was disallowed and the fund distributed to the creditors of the intestate leaving a very small
balance which was awarded to her. On exceptions filed to the report of the
Auditor, the same were dismissed and THOMPSON, P. J., gave the following
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reasons which were later approved by the Supreme Court. Explained the learned Judge:
"The decision of the auditor upon the claim of the widow of the
decedent, to an allowance of $300, under the provisions of the 5th
section of the Act of April 14, 1851, is entirely correct. That act
was designed to prevent the family of a decedent from being deprived of a home immediately upon his death, and the property
which the law exempts is to be retained by the widow. Neither
the intention nor the language of the act apply to the case of a wife
who has lived in a foreign country for years, separated from her
husband, and who never formed part of his family here."
In Fenyo's Est., 105 Pa. Superior Court 560 (1932) 161 A. 606, the decedent, an alien, died in Cambria County and left a widow, a resident of Czechoslovakia. The widow laid claim to her exemption and it was shown that she
was living in her native country for four years while her husband was living in
the United States. In affirming the decision of the Auditing Judge in disallowing the claim, BALDRIGE, J., said:
"The widow's right to an exemption of $500 is a gratuity under the
law, based upon the existence of the family relation at the time of
the decedent's death, and was not intended to apply where a wife
has lived for years in a foreign country, separate from her husband,
and not a part of the family, unless she was prevented from occupying that relation by the conduct of the husband. Spier's Appeal,
26 Pa. 233; Mallory's Estate, 300 Pa. 217, 150 A. 606; Finch's
Estate, 86 Pa. Super. Ct. 240. She was, therefore, not entitled to
the widow's exemption under the Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917,
P. L. 447 (20 PS Section 321 et seq.)."
In these two cases an 'excellent illustration is afforded of the evolution of
law through statute, judicial interpretation and statute. Section 5 of the Act of
April 14, 1851, P. L. 612, which was the subject of interpretation in Spier's
Appeal, supra, does not contain any reference whatsoever to the maintenance of
the family relationship. On the contrary the language is very broad as follows:
"That hereafter, the widow or the children of any decedent dying
within this Commonwealth, testate or intestate, may retain either
real or personal property belonging to said estate to the value of
$300, and the same shall not be sold, but suffered to remain for the
use of the widow and family."
As interpreted in later cases the phrase "for the use of the widow and family" meant that the exemption was for the widow who was presumed to use it
for the benefit of the family. If there was no family then the widow would
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be the sole beneficiary, but under any hypothesis nothing is said in the section
just quoted about the husband and wife living together at the time of the former's
decease. The sole specification was that the claimant be the lawful widow of
the decedent. Nevertheless, the requirement as interpolated into the section by
Spier's Appeal became the rule of law as is witnessed by many cases following
in the wake of the original decision.
Furthermore, in Fenyo's Estate, supra, we find the court following Spier's
Appeal by interpreting, in so doing, the later enactment of Section 12 of the
Fiduciaries Act, supra.
The exact language of Section 12 (a) on the point is as follows:
"The widow, if any, or if there be no widow, or if she has forfeited
her rights, then the children forming part of the family of any decedent dying, etc."
Here it will be observed that the phrase "forming part of the family of any
decedent" and which is an elaboration of the family relationship doctrine, is now
inserted by the legislature in the present enactment but the phrase does not by
construction modify or describe the widow but does describe the children. In
contrast, Section 5 of the Act of 1851, as quoted supra, merely mentioned the
widow and described the children as being those "of any decedent dying within
this Commonwealth, testate or intestate."
Despite these animadversions, it is undoubted and hornbook law at the
present time that the existence of the family relationship is the foundation of
the widow's exemption, and the entire course of decisions upon the Act of 1851,
as well as that of 1917, has laid emphasis upon this fact. In Crawford's Est.,
81 Pa. Superior Ct. 222 (1923), it was declared that there was no indication in
present legislation to depart from the established rule that the right to claim the
widow's exemption depends upon the existence of the family relation, unless the
separation occurred through the fault of the husband. Accordingly, it was
further observed that authorities under the Act of 1851 are persuasive in the
interpretation of Section 12, supra.
FORFEITURE

Section 12 (a) supra in its opening language of substantially a line and a
half refers to three situations: (1) the existence of a widow, (2) the non-existence of a widow, and (3) a widow who "has forfeited her rights."
The entire clause is silent as to what constitutes acts of forfeitwre but we
have already discussed in the previous subdivision the requirement of the family
relationship, and therefore the widow who fails to maintain that relationship,
unless she is without fault,' forfeits her right of exemption.
In addition the legislature may be presumed to have had in mind the enactment of Section 6 of the Intestate Act of 1917, 20 PS 42, stipulating that a wife
who was guilty of wilful and malicious desertion for a period of one year or
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upwards previous to the decease of her husband could claim no share in the
estate of the husband deceased. This is the only known statutory forfeiture.
In Fenyo's Est., supra, the facts as developed showed that for a period of years
before the death of the husband the wife in her native country was living in
adultery. According to the evidence the testator was acquainted with the infidelity of his wife yet it was held there was not sufficient evidence to show condonation. The adultery as charged, per se, was not sufficient to work a forfeiture
of the widow's share in the husband's estate, outside of her claim for exemption
which was denied, but the adultery committed was held sufficient to characterize
what otherwise might have been considered as a consentable separation into a
wilful and malicious desertion, thus depriving the widow of the right to take
against her husband's will according to the ruling in Lodge's Est., 287 Pa. 184
(1926), 134 A. 472.
In Fenyo's Est., supra, the widow made two claims, (1) for the exemption
and (2) for her share of the husband's estate under the Intestate Laws and rejecting the provisions of the will. Both claims were denied, the first for the
reason that desertion being established this involved obviously an absence of the
family relationship, and the second by -the establishment of desertion the provisions of Section 6 of the Intestate Act of 1917, supra, applied. However, the
widow did take under the provisions of her husband's will. Even though adultery
were shown during the continuance of the family relationship up to the death
of the husband, this would not have precluded the widow from recovering on
both claims, as adultery does not work a forfeiture under Section 6, supra, and
does not preclude the claim for exemption if, despite the infidelity, the family
relationship is maintained.
In Arnout's Estate, 283 Pa. 49 (1925), 128 A. 661, it was held that under
the facts a widow might be entitled to the surviving spouse's claim of $5,000
out of her husband's estate although the same facts would not entitle her to the
exemption for the reason that the family relationship was not maintained at the
time of the husband's death.
In Crawford's Estate, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 222 (1923), it was stated that a
widow who has forfeited her right to the exemption might still be entitled to
participate in the distribution of her husband's estate under the Intestate Law
as the widow's exemption is not an estate of inheritance but an independent
bounty of which the widow may be deprived where the family relationship is
shown not to exist. On the other hand, her claim under the Intestate Law is to
an estate by inheritance and of which she cannot be deprived except by conduct
falling within the terms of Section 6 of the Intestate Act, supra. See also
Braum's Est., 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 245 (1926), and Stauffer's Est., 89 Pa. Superior Ct. 531 (1926).
To the same Lffect is Mallory's Est., 300 Pa. 217 (1930), 150 A. 606,
wherein is an opinion by MOSCHZISKER, C. J., reviewing the leading cases on
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the topics of widow's exemption and the spouse's right to the $5,000 under the
Intestate Act.
The family relationship may not be maintained by the respective spouses
for a variety of reasons and our decisions, in analyzing the various situations,
have allowed to the widow the exemption where the family relationship was not
actually being maintained but the fault was that of the husband and the wife
was, in the terms of divorce language, "the injured and innocent spouse."
In Johnson's Est., 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 232 (1922), a wife was wrongfully
induced by her husband to leave their home and it was held that by such a separation she did not forfeit her right to her exemption at the death of the husband.
To the same effect is Schwartz's Est., 10 D. & C. 674 (1928), and Burkett's Est.,
5 C. C. 501 (1888), cited in Mallory's Est., supra.
In Mehaffey's Est., 102 Pa. Supirior C1. 228 (1931), 156 A. 746, it was
stated per CUNNINGHAM, J.,that "the fault of the husband in order to furnish
a justification for separation must be a serious one such as deserting, maltreating,
or abusing the wife, driving her away, or inducing her to leave the home," citing
Stauffer's Est., 89 Pa. Superior Ct. 531 (1926), but in such instances and others
which would constitute grounds of justification the widow will be allowed her
exemption although the family relationship has not been actually maintained.
Where a divorce a mensa et thoro was granted, it is the law, as set forth in
Hettrick v. Hettrick, 55 Pa. 290 (1867), that the widow in such an instance
is not entitled to the exemption. Generally, the rule of law is that where there
is a consentable separation the widow is not entitled to the exemption as the
family relationship is not being maintained and there is no fault attributed to
the deceased husband.
In Crawford's Est., 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 222 (1923), it was held that where
a husband and wife separated by mutual agreement three years before the death
of the former, in such a case the wife as widow was not entitled to have set
apart to her, as against creditors of the estate, the widow's exemption of $500
allowable under the provisions of Section 12, supra.
In the course of an able opinion, PORTER, J., explained:
"The sole question is: Has the widow the right to take the exemption when, in the absence of any evidence of misconduct on the
part of the decedent, she has been living apart from her husband
for three years immediately prior to his death in pursuance of
articles of separation voluntarily entered into upon her part? The
law was well settled, prior to the legislation of 1917, that when a
wife had been voluntarily living apart from her husband, without
such reasonable cause as would entitle her to a divorce, she did not
upon his death become entitled to the benefit of the exemption out
of his estate: Nye's App., 126 Pa. 341. None could claim who
did not stand in the family relation toward the decedent, unless the
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separation was the fault of the husband: Henkel's Est., 13 Pa.
Superior Ct. 337, and cases there cited. The language of the 12th
section of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917 does not follow literally the
Act of 1851, P. L. 612, but the provisions are substantially the
same, although it is to be noticed that the Act of 1917 makes the
right of the widow subject to the condition that she has not forftited her rights, which words are not in the Act of 1851."
Continuing in an explanation of the Act of 1917 and stating that the construction was the same as that of the Act of 1851, the question before the Court
wa; answered in the negative.
In accord, Stauffers Estate, 89 Pa. Superior Ct. 531 (1926), per CUNNINGHAM, J. See also Arnout's Estate, supra.
In Mehaffey's Est., 102 Pa. Superior Ct. 228 (1931), 156 A. 746, the
claim of the widow for the exemption was resisted by the children of the deceased husband and later rejected by the court. On appeal in explaining tht
law and Stauffer's Est., supra, CUNNINGHAM, J., observed:
"The forfeiture specified in Section 12 (a) of the Fiduciaries Act
is 'the forfeiture of the widow's exemption -established by a long
line of judicial decisions,' to the effect that a wife who did not
stand in the family relation toward the decedent at the time of his
death, but had been voluntarily living apart from him without such
reasonable cause as would entitle her to a divorce, had forfeited
the right to her exemption. As expressed in some of the cases,
the law granting the exemption contemplates the case of a wife
who lives with her husband until his death and faithfully performs
all her duties to his family, not one who voluntarily separates herself from him, 'unless the separation was the fault of the husband.'
But the 'fault,' in order to furnish justification for the separation,
must be a serious one-deserting, maltreating, or abusing her, driving her away, or inducing her to leave the home, and the like.
Stauffer's Estate, supra. A careful reading of the testimony in this
case fails to disclose any evidence which would support a finding
that the separation, admittedly existing at the date of the death of
the husband, was his fault within the meaning of the decided cases.
The court below therefore properly held that appellant had forfeited
her right to the exemption now granted by the Fiduciaries Act."

J.

See also Braum's Estate, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 245 (1926), per GAWTHROP,

As intimated in the cases just discussed, if the family relationship is not
being maintained through the fault of the husband, such "fault" being a serious
one as would justify the wife's withdrawal, under such facts the court will award
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to the widow her exemption, although the family relationship is not actually
maintained at the time of the death of the husband.
If, however, the separation is a consentable one the right to the exemption
is generally barred, apparently upon the theory of waiver rather than the failure
to maintain the family relationship. See remarks of PORTER, J., in Henkel's
Est., 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 337 (1900).
If this conclusion is correct it would logically follow that where there is an
agreement on the part of the spouses to live apart, but in the agreement the
mutual rights as husband and wife in the estates of 'each other are specifically
reserved, despite such a consentable separation the widow in case of the death of
the husband would be 'entitled to her exemption.
Another aspect of the matter of actual separation and an agreement incident
thereto is found in Sipel's Estate, 21 D. & C. 326 (1934), where there was an
agreement to separate which was executed by the spouses in the presence of the
husband's counsel and the wife did not have legal advice on the matter. At the
husband's death she was held entitled to the exemption despite the separation
agreement, where it was shown that the separation was due to the misconduct of
the husband, which would have entitled the wife to a divorce, and the agreement
was made to stop a criminal prosecution by her against the husband. It was
shown, inter alia, that the decedent by his brutality inflicted on the wife serious
physical injuries, blackening her eyes, knocking out her teeth and otherwise abusing her in repeated assaults upon her person.
Said APPEL, P. J., of the Orphans' Court of Lancaster County:
"The agreement nowhere contains or refers to a surrender of any
claim she may have against the decedent's estate in case he predeceases her. Neither does it contain any stipulation that a separation which was occurring was or should be by agreement which
would bar her right to the exemption now claimed by her. That
there was never at any time such an agreement is amply sustained
by the testimony. On the contrary, it shows that she repeatedly and
consistently, both before the agreement was executed and afterwards, beseeched decedent to mend his conduct, leave his evil associations, and return to his home where she would receive him as he'
husband. This she hoped for up to the time of his unexpected
death. He, however, never returned. We have no difficulty in
finding, and we do so find, that the separation was entirely due to
his misconduct, and that this misconduct was such as would have
entitled her to a divorce. This case does not come, therefore, within
the class of cases where there is an amicable separation with the
result that the exemption may not be claimed by the widow: Crawford's Estate, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 222; Stauffer's Estate, 89 Pa.
Superior Ct. 531, and many others that might be cited."
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It will be recalled that the Act of 1851 made no mention of a possible forfeiture of the widow's right of exemption but that the courts interpolated into
the enactment the doctrine of the family relationship. In Section 12 (a) there
was inserted in reference to the widow the qualifying clause "if she has forfeited
her rights." In Mehaffey's Estate, supra, CUNNINGHAM, J., remarked, concerning the forfeiture clause in Section 12 (a) that the forfeiture as specified
was established "by a long line of judicial decisions." Most of the cases have
applied the family relation doctrine as developed, but in addition to this feature
there are two other situations as evolved by the courts as causes for forfeiture and
they will now be considered.
REMARRIAGE

In Heckman's Estate, 17 D. & C. 761 (1932), DAVISON, P. J. of the
Orphans' Court of Franklin County, inter alia, remarked:
"It cannot be denied that if a widow remarries and then claims her
exemption from her husband's estate she is barred from receiving
such exemption."
No authorities were cited by the learned judge to sustain this proposition as
the remark was made obiter. However, a survey of the cases discloses many
similar remarks and actual decisions characterizing remarriage of the widow as a
cause of forfeiture.
The doctrine of exemption forfeiture by the remarriage of the widow is a
curious and interesting illustration of legal reasoning and judicial interpolation
of a statute. The logic runs in this wise: The statute accords to the widow
certain exempt property of her deceased husband's estate, if the marriage relationship is maintained to the time of death; the statute accords the privilege to
the widow and it must be exercised as widow. Upon remarriage the former
widow is no longer widow; therefore, if the exemption is requested after the
remarriage, the petitioner does not come within the terms of the statute. The
right of exemption being a gratuity and a privilege, the rights under the statute
only become such when exercised and do not relate back to the death of the
husband.
The evolution of this matter as traced through the decisions affords comfort
to the legal theorist whose 'explanation of decisions is by way of so-called "functional approach." In short, so runs the latter reasoning, the, judges determine
that: remarried widows ought not to have the exemption and then proceed to
establish a reason therefor. Furthermore, it is to be observed that the doctrine
of forfeiture by remarriage is intertwined with the doctrine of forfeiture by delay
to be discussed hereafter.
In Burk v. Gleason, 46 Pa. 297 (1863), the matter seems to have been
mooted for the first time. A widow claimed her statutory allowance under the
Act of 1851 but not until after the lapse of several years, meanwhile contracting
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a second marriage.

The case was decided upon the lapse of time. Said WOOD-

WARD, J.,
"That act was passed for the benefit of the 'widow or children of
any decedent.' Burk left no children. Was Mrs. Gleason his
'widow,' within the spirit and meaning of the act? We think she
was not. If she meant to assert her rights of widowhood, she
should have done it in a reasonable time after her husband's death
-in the forms of a legal administration-and whilst she was a
widow indeed. To delay her claim seven years, and then to prosecute it through a second husband, would be an application of the
statute which was not intended, and cannot be permitted. If any
widow could be permitted to come in under this statute, after a second marriage, the laches of this widow was gross enough to postpone her."
In Commonwealth v. Powell, 51 Pa. 438 (1866), THOMPSON, J.,solved
the interesting question as to when a widow was not a widow in determining
that where a mother-in-law bequeathed the residue of her estate to her daughterin-law, who was the widow of her son, and later the widow remarried in the
lifetime of the testatrix and was still married at her death, the bequest was subject to the collateral inheritance tax as the legatee was no longer the widow of
the son and therefore did not come within the provisions of the Act of 1849,
exemption from the operation of the collateral inheritance tax law property
"passing by will to, or in trust for, the wife or widow of a son of any person
dying seised or possessed thereof."
In Shumate v. McGarity, 83 Pa. 38 (1876), where the claim of a widow
for exemption was rejected, inter alia, by reason of the lapse of time, fourteen
years having passed from the time of her husband's death, GORDON J.,made
the comment relative to Burk v. Gleason, supra, and Commonwealth v. Powell,
supra, that they stood for the proposition that a widow upon remarriage forfeited her right to the exemption.
However, a study of these cases reveals the facts that the remarriage question
was never actually involved and the remarks of the judges were obiter dicta.
Thus the matter stood when the case of Kerns' Appeal, 120 Pa. 523 (1888),
14 A. 435, came before the Supreme Court. The facts were that the petitioner
delayed for over three years to assert her claim as widow under the Exemption
Act of 1851, and the facts were clearly one of lapse of time, although in the
meanwhile the widow had remarried. Nevertheless, GREEN, J., in reviewing
Burk v. Gleason, Commonwealth v. Powell, and Shumate v. McGarity, supra,
and commenting upon the same, drew the following conclusion:
"In the first of them the question did not arise, but we held in another connection that if a widow's rights, as widow, in her husband's
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property, had once vested, they were not lost by the fact of a subsequent marriage. In the same case, however, we held that a
widow is a woman who has lost her husband and remains unmarried."
In Machemer's Estate, 140 Pa. 544 (1891), 21 A. 441, the facts were that

the widow had remarried and had died without having made claim to her
'xernption under the Act of 1851, whereupon her executor did make the claim
which was denied, the court holding that the right under the statute is a privilege
to retain and not an absolute transfer of a part of the estate.
Notwithstanding the lack of any satisfactory authority for the proposition
of forfeiture by remarriage, in Clark's Estate, 275 Pa. 506 (1923, 119 A. 590,
SIMPSON, J., opines:
"It may now be considered as established by Kern's App., 120 Pa.
523, and Machemer's Est., 140 Pa. 544,-that the earlier conflicting
authorities being overruled therein,-that if there has been no sale
of the property allotted to a widow, an award of exemption to her
may be set aside, on due application, if she had remarried 'before
her election was made,' or if there was a 'delay of a year in claiming
her exemption'."
Apparently there are no clearcut decisions upon this question of forfeiture
by remarriage to be found in the appellate court reports. In Cramm's Est., 114
Pa. Superior Ct. 348 (1934), 174 A. 838, PARKER, J., cites Clark's Estate,
supra, and repeats the quotation from SIMPSON, J., as already given, but here
again the facts did not include remarriage, the contest being on the ground of
lapse of time and the widow's delay.
In Alfree's Est., 22 D. R. 486 (1913), LAMORELLE, J., of the Orphans'
Court of Philadelphia County, on petition, answer and replication determined
that a remarried widow was not entitled to the exemption, saying:
"A widow is defined to be an unmarried woman whose husband is
dead; one who has lost her husband by death, and has not taken
another: Words and Phrases, 7457, and cases there cited.
"As used in our act above referred to, it means the state and not
the person. In the legal as well as the popular conception a widow
is a woman in an unmarried state: Com. v. Powell, 51 Pa. 438.
She ceases to be a widow when she remarries: Kern's Appeal, 120
Pa. 523. The right does not vest as of the date of the death of tht
husband; the widow must make the claim, and, at the time of making, she must fulfill the requirements of the act. The case of Cierlinski v. Rys, 225 Pa. 312, is not in point. It is an authority that
a decree of a court having jurisdiction, even though erroneous, is
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conclusive in a collateral proceeding. The present application is
ruled by our own decision in Seittehspinner's Estate, 6 Dist. R. 454,
where we squarely ruled that a widow's claim to the exemption is
barred if, at the time, she has remarried."
In Alfree's Est., supra, the husband died July 15, 1912; the widow re-

married November 27, 1912. It was not until March, 1913 that she filed her
petition for the exemption. The case more properly stands for forfeiture- by
delay or lapse of time, to be considered infra. Likewise in Seittenspinner's Est.,
6 D. R. 454 (1897), the facts were the husband died January 4, 1890, his
widow later remarried, and on April 1, 1897, more than seven years thereafter,
presented her claim for the exemption. It is true that in this case the reason
for the delay in filing the claim was that at the time of the death of the husband
he apparently left no estate out of which her claim for exemption could be paid
and the claim was later made out of property which fell to the estate of the husband by reason of the death of a life tenant. Nevertheless, as will be pointed
out in the discussion on DELAY OR LAPSE OF TIME, infra, these facts presented no lawful excuse, but in the case the court seized the fact of remarriage to
justify the decision.
As far as can be ascertained the cases already discussed constitute the sole
authority for the proposition. Moreover, it is noteworthy to observe that Scott
in his work on the Intestate System of Pennsylvania, at page 175, written in
1871, takes the opposite view, wherein it is said:
"By the intestate laws of the State, the interest of the widow is fixed
the moment she becomes a widow, and is not divested by a subsequent marriage. So also is her right of election to take under the
will of her husband or the intestate laws. And for the same reason
it is, that the right to retain three hundred dollars, out of the estate
of her husband exists, although, before doing so, a second marriage
may have taken place. Whenever a right by law has attached by
reason of widowhood, there must be some law by which it is divested, or it will remain."
In some of the cases the widow's exemption is referred to as a right, in
others as a privilege, and in still others as a gratuity.
It is undoubtedly a right in the general sense of that term which, inter alia,
denotes property, interest, power, prerogative, immunity, and privilege. It is
not an absolute right such as the widow's right of election and her right to inherit
or take under the Intestate Laws. It is a relative right in the sense that it must
be personally exercised, hence as stated in Machemer's Est., supra, it cannot be
exercised after the widow's death by her executor. Moreover, if the widow
does not ask for it, no one else can do so in her stead, and the children may
even be precluded by her neglect or refusal to exercise this right.
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Nevertheless, the observation as made by Scott, supra, appears to be sound,
viz, that the right of exemption attaches immediately upon the death of the
husband and there is apparently no law by which this right is divested except
such as is within the terms of the statute. And it is apparent that Section 12
of the Fiduciaries Act, supra, makcs no reference to any forfeiture by the remarr:iage of the widow. Non constat the remarks of CUNNINGHAM, J., in
Stauffer's Estate, supra.
DELAY OR LAPSE OF TIME

Another cause of forfeiture of the widow's exemption, as interpolated into
the st:atute by judicial decision, is that of delay or lapse of time.
In Clark's Estate, supra, SIMPSON, J., referring to Kerns' App., supra, and
Machemer's Est., supra, asserted that the established dogma was that a delay of
a year in claiming her exemption was an effectual bar to the widow.
In Cramm's Estate, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 463 (1934), 174 A. 838, the
pontifical statement of SIMPSON, J., was quoted by PARKER, J., with approval, and in reversing the judgment of the lower court it was held that under
the facts a widow's delay for more than nineteen months after her husband's
death, and for more than thirteen months after letters testamentary were issued,
before claiming the exemption was laches, constituting a waiver of the right notwithsl:anding the widow thought that the estate would be settled out of court.
In this case the husband died testate May 5, 1931. Thereafter his will was
admitted to probate and on October 31, 1931 letters testamentary were issued
to the executrix, one Mary Cramm. December 1, 1931, the widow, Minnie
Cramm, elected to take against the will of her husband. No other steps were
taken until December 7, 1932 when the executrix presented a petition for the
sale of the decedent's real estate for the payment of debts, and on December 22,
1932 the widow presented a petition praying to have the decedent's real estate
set aside to her as her exemption. Appraisers were appointed and a return made
to the court and exceptions filed by the residuary devisees. After taking testimony the exceptions were dismissed and the appraisal finally confirmed; whereupon the present appeal was taken.
PARKER, J.,after reviewing the facts and some of the cases, concluded:
"No specific time was fixed by the statutes either of 1851 or of
1917 within which a demand for appraisement must be made.
However, in the leading case of Kerns' Appeal, 120 Pa. 523, 530,
14 A. 435, 437, the Supreme Court very definitely said: 'While we
do not mean to say that she should be allowed so much as one year
in which to claim her $300 exemption, the analogy of the statute
which subjects her to a compulsory citation to elect as against a will,
at the expiration of 12 months from her husband's death, admonishes us that a delay of a year in claiming her exemption is gross
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laches, and in itself evidence of a waiver of her right.' In that connection the court there pointed out that there was no reason for any
serious delay in the exercise of a widow's right of exemption, for
she is entitled to it whether her husband died testate or intestate,
and while she needs time to inform herself as to the condition of
the estate before making an election to take against the will for
which she is allowed a period of one year, there is no occasion for
any such delay in the claim for exemption."
After referring to Clark's Estate, supra, and the kindred authorities, the
learned judge lays down the following rule:
"We are likewise of the opinion that the only logical point at which
the line may be drawn is after the period of one year. Having the
very definite statements by the Supreme Court, we hold that the
delay of the widow for nineteen months after her husband's death
and for more than thirteen months after letters testamentary were
issued on his estate is evidence of laches and amounts to a waiver."
Concerning the excuse of the widow for not presenting her claim sooner,
the learned judge thus explains:
"The appellee contends that there are special circumstances which
should be taken into account in determining whether there was a
waiver and relies upon the following question and answer: 'After
he died why did you wait until December, 1932, to claim your
widow's exemption? A. We thought it would be settled out of court.
I first hired legal counsel to protect my interest in December, 1932.
I am 58 years of age.' More than a year prior to the presentation
of the claim for exemption, the widow had elected to take against
the will, which would indicate that she had some knowledge of her
rights. She does not say that she had made any claim for her
exemption or that there were, in fact, any negotiations looking to a
settlement, but depends upon the mere bald statement that she
thought it would be settled out of court. This comes far short of
explaining the delay. If this were a good answer to such a delay,
it would nullify the rule."
A study of the cases enunciating the doctrine of laches or waiver of the
widow's exemption presents a parallelism in legal reasoning with the cases already
discussed under the doctrine of remarriage. Heme, as in the latter doctrine, the
courts have read into the statute a stipulation not the product of the legislative
enactment. It is true that one may lose a right by laches, and the legislature in
the enacting of the several statutes of limitation has established a time limit to
certain actions. In equity the doctrine of laches is applied frequently. Section
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12 of the Fiduciaries Act, supra, is silent as to the time in which the widow is to
file her application for the exemption, and the decisions discussed under the
general topic of the right of exemption emphasize the tenderness of the law
towards the widow and the children. Furthermore, it is obvious that if the
widow with a knowledge of her rights does not assert the same, meanwhile
permitting the rights of third persons to intervene, in such cases the doctrine of
laches is justly applied, but it is a far cry from this situation to that of a dogmatic
rule laid down by the courts as a judicial statute of limitation within which
the claim for exemption must be made or otherwise the widow is barred.
Reference has already been made to Clark's Estate, supra, wherein SIMPSON, J., laid down the rule in reference to forfeiture by remarriage, and it will
be recalled that in the same quotation the learned justice declared in substance
th t a delay of a year in claiming the exemption was fatal. These remarks are
of more than ordinary significance because in the cases referred to as substantiating this doctrine, the question under consideration was not the original granting
of the application of the widow but the setting aside by the court of that which
had already been decreed.
It is possible to trace the doctrine of a specific time limit on the widow's
right of exemption to Kerns' Appeal, 120 Pa. 523 (1888), 14 A. 435. In Crider's
Est., 20 D. & C. 113 (1933), DAVISON, P. J. of the Orphans' Court of
Franklin County, having a similar question under consideration, observed that
the leading case in reference to a delay by widow in making her claim for exemption was that of Kerns' Appeal, supra.
In the latter case the delay was over three years and in the meanwhile the
widow had remarried.
In reversing the decree of the court below and ordering the confirmation
of the widow's appraisement to be vacated and set aside and the appraisement
and all proceedings adjudged null and void, GREEN, J., declared:
"In the present case the delay was for almost three. and a half years.
In the meantime, no election by the widow having been made, the
appellant had brought her action of ejectment to recover the land
devised, and, of course, had incurred expense in doing so. Nothing
appeared of record to show that the widow intended to elect to
take her exemption. Although the paper in which she declared her
election bore date on September 8, 1883, two days before the writ
of ejectment was issued by the appellant, it was a mere private
paper in the possession of the widow, and was no notice to the
appellant. Nor was any notice ever given to the appellant of the
widow's election. The fact of her election first appeared upon the
record of the Orphans' Court on September 24, 1883, more than
three years and five months after her husband's death. We have
no hesitation in deciding, as we now do, that this was gross laches
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on the part of the widow in exercising her right of election to take
the benefit of her exemption, and operates as conclusive proof of a
waiver of her right."
Kerns' Appeal, supra, was properly decided, particularly in view of the fact
that the land which was the subject of appraisement had not passed into the
hands of holders for value and without notice, but in the course of the opinion
the learned justice made other observations which influenced later courts in the
establishment of a specific time limit. Said GREEN, J.:
"There is no reason for any serious delay in the exercise of a
widow's right of exemption, because she is entitled to it, whether
her husband has died testate or intestate, and in this respect it
differs from her election to take under his will. In the latter case
she needs time enough to inform herself as to the condition of the
estate, before making her election, and she is allowed one year in
which to do so by the express provision of a statute. While we do
not mean to say that she should be allowed so much as one year
in which to claim her $300 exemption, the analogy of the statute
which subjects her to a compulsory citation to elect as against a
will, at the expiration of twelve months from her husband's death,
admonishes us that a delay of a year in claiming her exemption is
gross laches, and in itself evidence of a waiver of her right."
Despite the judicial suggestion, six years later STEWART, P. J. of the
Orphans' Court of Franklin County, in Snider's Est., 4 D. R. 458 (1894),
allowed the widow her exemption although there was a delay of two and a half
years, pointing out that such a delay did not prejudice or disappoint anyone.
However, it was observed by the learned judge that if the demand for appraisement had been delayed more than three years he would have been compelled
under the authority of Kerns' Appeal, supra, to withhold confirmation. Commenting upon the case Judge Stewart, afterwards a justice of the Supreme
Court, explained:
"That case decides that a delay of over three years on the part of a
widow in exercising her right to take $300 in money or property
of her deceased husband's estate, under the exemption law of 1851,
is fatal to her right and conclusive evidence of a waiver. It affords
no authority, however, for holding that such legal conclusion follows any shorter period of delay. There may be cases where continued delay, though short of the three years, will work a forfeiture
of the right to the exemption but, whenever this results, there will
be found other circumstances contributing. Here the delay was for
two and a half years, but under circumstances which ought not to
prejudice the widow's claim. Her delay disappoints no one. By
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an arrangement between herself and the only other person interested in the estate-a son-legal administration of the estate was to
be dispensed with, she retaining such articles of personal property
as she desired, the balance to be sold. It is of no consequence to
inquire what led to a change of purpose. It is enough to know that
within three years of the death, letters of administration were
granted to the widow; that the personal property which remained
in her possession after her husband's death is still there, easily and
certainly distinguishable; that no prejudice can come to any one,
whether heir or creditor, by allowing her the benefit of an appraisement."
Likewise in the case where time did not affect the estate or those interested
therein prejudicially, it was held in Reed's, Est., 21 D. R. 906 (1912) by the
late Judge GILLAN of Franklin County, that a delay of less than two years in
making demand for the exemption was not a bar in view of the fact that no
money had been paid to creditors and nothing had been done which could change
the 'position of the parties. The learned judge commented on the fact that
there was no time limit fixed by the Act and furthermore it was difficult to
reconcile the various deliverances of our courts on this subject and that each
case must necessarily be regulated by its own peculiar circumstances.
In the writing of this opinion Judge GILLAN had before him the opinion
of his predecessor, Judge STEWART, in Lane's Est., 6 D. R. 618 (1897),
wheein it was observed that the claim was sufficient in time if made before
the situation with respect to the estate had been so changed as to involve expense
and embarrassment from its allowance.
On the other hand in Crider's Est., supra, Judge DAVISON of the same
court and the successor of Judge GILLAN, held that the widow was barred by
laches from claiming her 'exemption where the claim was not made until more
than five years after the husband's death. In this case in a valuable opinion
reviewing the various cases, the learned judge remarked:
"Upon the argument in this case and in considering it at the time of
that argument, we were much inclined to the opinion that the
widow should be allowed her exemption as claimed, and that, as
the rights of no other person had been in any way interfered with
and as there was no change in the situation in this estate because
of her delay in making this claim, she should not, because of her
laches, be' deprived'of that claim, which is intended for the support
of the widow upon the death of the husband and in regard to
which the law has always been careful to make allowance, if possible. Upon examination of the authorities, however, we are of the
opinion that, whatever our own thought of the case may be, we are
bound by the opinions filed by the Supreme Court of this State,
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and that we cannot allow this exemption after a delay of more than
five years."
From a review of these cases it would appear that the doctrine of forfeiture
of the exemption by delay is well established in the decisional law, but it is
doubtful whether a specific time limit can be supported. What would be an
unreasonable delay due to intervening rights, in one case might not be considered
as an unreasonable delay in another case, where there were no intervening rights.
Furthermore, in the latter case the period of time might even be longer. Until
the legislature establishes by statute a specific time limit, it will not be extraordinary to continue to find, as Judge GILLAN observed, that many of the deliverances of the courts are irreconcileable on this topic. However, in the administration of an estate the widow should be advised of her rights and admonished
to make her claim as soon as conveniently may be done following the filing of
the inventory and appraisement.
CHILDREN'S EXEMPTION

Section 12 (e) of the Fiduciaries Act, supra, 20 PS 475, is as follows:
"Inthe case of any decedent leaving to survive him any minor child
or children forming part of his family, and no widow, his administrator or executor, without request made to him by any one, shall
have appraised and set aside, for the use and benefit of all such
minor children of said decedent, property to the full value of five
hundred dollars."
The draftsmen have appended to this clause the following explanatory note:
"Note-This is Section 1 of the Act of June 4, 1883, P. L. 74, 1
Purd. 1096, substituting 'five hundred dollarg' for 'now allowed
by law,' etc., and 'minor child or children forming part of his
family' for 'child or children under the age of fourteen years'."
As indicated in the discussion of Section 12 (a) of the Fiduciaries Act,
supra, the right to the exemption is given first, to the widow and second, to "the
children forming part of the family of any decedent dying, testate or intestate,
within this Commonwealth, or dying outside of this Commonwealth but whose
estate is settled in this Commonwealth."
In the latter case there is no widow
or under the several situations already discussed, the widow, if any, has been
eliminated.
The original language of the Act of 1851 was "that hereafter the widow
or the children of any decedent dying within this Commonwealth, testate or
intestate, may retain either real or personal property belonging to said estate to
the value of $300."
The Act of June 4, 1883, P. L. 74, provided, inter alia, "that hereafter in
the case of any decedent leaving to survive him any child or children under the
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age of fourteen years, and no widow, his administrator or executor, without
request made to him by anyone, shall have appraised and set aside, for the use
and benefit of all the minor children of said decedent, property to the full value
now allowed by law to the widow or children of decedents, upon demand made."
The Act of May 6, 1909, P. L. 459, provided the exemption to the classes
mentioned out of the estates of decedents dying outside of the Commonwealth,
but whose estates are settled in the Commonwealth.
JItwill be noted, therefore, that all of these provisions relative to both
widows and children are embodied in Section 12 (a) and (e) 1, supra, eliminating, however, the age limit of fourteen years as stipulated in the Act of 1883.
A recapitulation of the matter results in the following classes of children
as entitled to the exemption where there is no widow involved, and as these
classes are distinguished by the courts in the decisions construing and interpreting
the statutory law:
(1) children forming part of the family of any decedent and irrespective of age;
(2)

any minor child or children forming part of the family;

(3) both of the above classes may claim the exemption out of either
the estate of the father, or, the father being dead and the mother
dying, out of the latter's estate.
The classes as above delineated will now be discussed in their order.
In Lane's Est., 6 D. R. 618 (1897), there was rendered by STEWART, P.
J., of the Orphans' Court of Franklin County, an important decision construing
the Act of 1851. This case became the leading one on the construction of the
Act and was repeatedly followed by other orphans' courts of the Commonwealth,
and its reasoning was approved by the Supreme Court. Its interpretative features
were later embodied in the specific language of Section 12 (a), supra. The
facts were: the decedent was a retired clergyman. He had been a widower for
a number of years before his death. He left surviving him two daughters, his
only children, both adults; one married and residing with her husband in their
3wn home; the other-this claimant-unmarried and residing with her father.
At the time of Mr. Line's death, the only two members of his family and household were himself and this unmarried daughter. The estate was ample, not
ncumbered with any debt, and, under the will, it was divided between the two
laughters. Jane F. Lane, the claimant, had an estate derived through her
mother which was estimated at between $5000 and $6000.
It was held that an adult daughter was entitled to the exemption where she
was the only child living with the testator at the time of his death and there was
io widow to take it. Furthermore, the fact that the claimant had a separate
.state of her own and was not dependent upon the testator did not preclude
ier claim, if she was a bona fide member of the decedent's family at the time of
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his death. The family relation and residence with the decedent and not the
dependence of the daughter is the criterion of her right.
Jane Lane was an adult, unmarried daughter, but at the time of her father's
death she was a part of his family and that was the ruling factor. The contrary
situation on the facts of the family relationship and the condition of the claimant
appear in Hook's Est., 3 D. & C. 692 (1923), wherein it appeared that for
seventeen years before his death decedent divided his time between the residence of the claimant, his married daughter, and her husband in Philadelphia
and a farm he owned in New Jersey. Until within a year of his death he conducted a tailoring business on the ground floor of the PhilaJelphia property.
One year before his death he gave this business to his daughter. Until a year
before he died decedent paid the rent; claimant and her husband all other expenses. During the last year of his life he paid nothing and lived with claimant
as her guest when in Philadelphia: Held, that the family relationship did not
exist and the claim by the daughter for the exemption of $500 should be disallowed.
Furthermore, it was observed, per GEST, J., citing inter alia, Lane's Estate,
supra, that under Section 12 (a) of the Fiduciaries Act of June 7, 1917, P. L.
447, it is not necessary that the children of the decedent, to obtain the exemption
of $500, should be minors or should have been dependent upon their father, but
it is necessary that they should form part of his family.
The ruling factor in Hook's Estate, supra, was that the claimant daughter
did not constitute a part of the father's family at the time of the latter's death.
The fact that the claimant is single or married is not a determinent factor except
as it may throw light upon the fact of the family relation. This is illustrated
in Stevenson's Est., 23 D. R. 747 (1912), where the facts were the decedent was
within a few days of 74 years of age when he died. His daughter, Margaret,
the claimant, was then married and, together with her husband, lived in the home
provided by the father. The family relation was maintained by these parties
until the date of the father's death. The claimant was a child of the second
marriage, but none of the decedent's other children or grandchildren lived with
the father or grandfather for a long time prior to the decedent's death. The
daughter was not dependent upon her father. Nevertheless, it was held by
TRIMBLE, J., of the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, that claimant was
entitled to the exemption.
Said the learned judge:
"But this claimant was married and not dependent upon her father
and there is no appellate decision which sustains any claim of this
character. The correct view of the act is set forth in the opinion of
Judge Penrose in Palethorp's Estate, 3 Dist. R. 145, as follows:
" 'The Acts of essembly which confer upon the widow of a decedent
her right to exemption are not dependent for their operation upon her
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necessities. She may have unlimited means of her own, htr husband's will may make the most ample provision for her support;
but whether he died testate or intestate, solvent or insolvent, rich
or poor, is immaterial. The Act of April 14, 1851, P. L. 612, is
'the widow or children of any decedent dying within this Commonwealth, testate or intestate, may retain, etc.'
"In Lane's Estate, 6 Dist. R. 618, decided by Judge Stewart, it
was held that the criterion for recovery by an adult daughter is not
dependence, but the maintenance of the family and residence with
the testator. If it is the law that a widow who is financially independent of her husband may retain the exempted property when
she has maintained the family relation with her husband, then the
only reasonable construction of the act is to say that a daughter
may likecyise retain it when she is independent of her father, if
she maintains the family residence and relation with him, even
though she may be married."
See also Hettrick v. Hettrick, 55 Pa. 290 (1867).
From the above authorities the law is well established that an adult child
living with the father as a part of his family at the time of his death is entitled
to the exemption, there being no widow, under the provisions of Section 12 (a),
supra, being in the class of children "forming part of the family of any decedent."
The emphasis is to be placed upon the fact that the child is living with the
father, not the father with the child. "The family" stipulated in the law is the
family of the decedent. If this relationship is established by the claimant with
the father, then neither age nor marriage are relevant facts. Furthermore, neither
dependency nor actual need are relevant.
However, in this particular class of claimants the exemption must be claimed.
On the other hand, viewing the terms of Section 12 (e) 1, supra, it appears
that the provisions apply to a minor child or children of the decedent "forming
part of his family" and there being no widow. In such a case the law imposes
upon the administrator or executor of the decedent the duty of having appraised
and set aside for the use and benefit of all such minor children the exemption
stipulated, "without request to him made by anyone."
Unlike the provisions of the Act of 1883, supra, there is no specification of
minority age. The requisite is that the child or children shall be minors, that is
below the legal age of 21 years and they must form a part of the decedent's
family.
If there is only one minor child the full value of $500 is set aside for the
benefit of this particular child, but if there are two or more minor children
forming part of the decedent's family then the exempted property is applied for
the use evenly and equally of the several minor children.
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Another situation which has arisen is exemplified in Gheringer's Est., 10
D. & C. 279 (1928), wherein the family of the decedent consisted of one adult
child and one minor child. It was held per LAMORELLE, P. J., of the Orphans'
Court of Philadelphia County, that each was entitled to his pro rata interest in
the exemption. Even where the application is made by the executor or administrator to set aside the exemption in favor of the minor, the minor is entitled
only to such part of the $500 as, taken with the interest of the other children
forming part of the family at the time of his death, makes the total sum. Referring to Section 12 (e) 1, supra, the learned judge explained:
"Standing alone and because of the wording 'property to the full
value of five hundred dollars,' it would exclude the adult child.
It must, however, be read in connection with Section 12 (a), in
which circumstances not $500, but such part alone thereof as makes
up the total exemption is to be set apart for the minor. The widow
or children who have attained their majority must act of their own
accord; failing to act, no duty devolves on the executor or administrator. When, however, the rights of minors are concerned, a duty
is imposed upon the fiduciary; with him is the laboring oar, and
this for obvious reasons; and what he is called upon to claim is the
minor's share of the $500. In the present case, acting upon a
mistaken interpretation of section 12, and despite the fact that
there was a guardian, he claimed everything."
Both clauses of Section 12 (a) and (e) 1, refer to there being no widow
standing in the way of the claim of the children. The widow may be eliminatcd in various ways as already indicated, although actually living. Another
phase of the latter situation may be due to either divorce absolute or a mensa
et thoro or it may be by legal separation.
In Hettrick v. Hettrick, 55 Pa. 290 (1867), there is an illustration of a
divorce a mensa et thoro and in Grossman's Estate (No. 1), 263 Pa. 139 (1919),
106 A. 86, a case of absolute divorce, howbeit in Reno, Nevada.
In Henkel's Est., 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 337 (1900), the widow survived her
husband but the family relationship was not sustained by reason of an agreement
of separation. It was held that although the latter would defeat the claim of
the widow for exemption, nevertheless her existence would not defeat the claim
of the minor children. It is not the mere existence of a widow but the existence of her right which defeats the right of the children. Hence, if there be no
widow capable of claiming the provision, the dependent family is not to be
defeated because there is living a widow who is not capable of taking.
Another angle of the minor children's right arose in the case of McGovern's
Est., 9 D. & C. 532 (1927), wherein the decedent died leaving to survive him
no widow but five minor children. The maternal grandmother had the care
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and custody of these minor children and kept them together as a family before
and after the death of the father. The grandmother supported and maintained
the children receiving from the father for that purpose the sum of $10 per week.
At the request of the grandmother there was appraised and set aside as the children's exemption the sum of $500 in cash. This appraisement was confirmed by
the court. Later the grandmother presented her petition setting forth the
essential facts and praying for an order that the exemption as allowed the children
should be paid to her in order to continue the support and maintenance of the
minors and to reimburse the grandmother for the support and care already expended by her in behalf of these children. This order was made per MARX,
P. J. of the Orphans' Court of Berks County, saying:
"Since the $500 set aside to the use and benefit of these minors was
intended for the care and maintenance of said minors during the
settlement of the estate, and petitioner now asks that the same be
decreed to her, the right thereto in said minors having been established, equity impels us to grant the petition, make the decree as
prayed, and do directly what we would do were the fund to be first
paid to a guardian or trustee."
[n Bryan's Est., 22 D. & C. 713 (1935), the question was presented to the
Orphans' Court of Lawrence County on a petition to set aside a minor's exemption as to whether a minor child duly adopted under the Act of April 4, 1925,
P. L. 127, and forming a part of decedent's family and household at the time
of his death was entitled to the exemption under Section 12 (e) 1, supra.
CHAMBERS, J., answered this question in the affirmative observing that so far
as the court was able to discover this question has not hitherto been decided.
Reviewing the inheritance rights of the child, the learned court observed:
"It appears to us that it would be foolish to say that, under this
language, a child could inherit property from its adoptive parents
but would be barred from claiming an -exemption in the same estate.
Surely its rights in one respect would be just as great as in the
other."
Quere, under a set of facts similar to McGovern's Estale, supra, but where
the grandmother dies leaving an estate but no husband, would the grandchildren
forming a part of'her family be entitled to the exemption?
The remaining class of claimants to be considered appear where the father
is dead and the mother as his widow dies leaving children as a part of the family.
Are such children within the scope of the clauses of Section 12 (a) and (e) 1
of the Fiduciaries Act, supra? A similar question was presented under the Act
of 1851 in King's Appeal, 84 Pa. 345 (1877), wherein the father died leaving
his widow and three minor children. Later the widow remarried K and in turn
died leaving K and the aforesaid children surviving. The children did not make
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their home with the stepfather but lived elsewhere under arrangements made by
their guardian. K administered the estate of the mother and to him the guardian
applied to have appraised and set apart for the use of the children $300 under
the Act of 1851. K refused, and the guardian obtained a rule upon him to
show cause why the property should not be appraised and set aside for the use
of his wards. K in his answer denied that petitioner was in law entitled to have
the property so appraised and set aside. The court made the rule absolute and
an appeal was taken. In reversing the decree of the court below, MERCUR, J.,
inter alia, said:
"The main purpose of the act is to provide for the widow. Its
meaning and spirit limit its operation to the property left by the
husband or father. It was not intended to apply to the property of
a wife. This view is in harmony with all our decisions giving construction to the statute. The learned judge therefore erred in making the rule absolute."
The question whether the word decedent as used in the Act of 1851 embraced the mother and whether in case of her death $300 worth of her property
could be taken by her children in like manner as property set apart in case of the
death of the husband and father, arose for the first time in King's Appeal, supra.
However, despite the opinion of MERCUR, J., placing the rule squarely upon
the interpretation of the Act as not including the mother in the word decedent,
the facts of the case show that the mother upon her decease had a husband
surviving, and furthermore it was apparent that the children constituted a part
of her family at the time of her death. The question next arose in Himes's App.,
94 Pa. 381 (1880), and it was held that where a widow died leaving real and
personal property, her only surviving child was entitled to the exemption under
the act of 1851. It is true that in this case the husband was not found to have
actually died but had deserted his wife and remained unheard of for more than
seven years previous to her death, and apparently the court applied the presumption of death rule. In distinguishing King's Appeal, supra, it was said
by the Supreme Court per curiam:
"Inseeking to ascertain the true ruling in any case, due regard must
be had to the facts on which it was decided. The contention there
was between the husband of the deceased wife and her children.
The children of the wife sought to claim it against the rights of
her surviving husband. Here there was neither husband nor wife.
It was the property of a widow, and the contention is between a
creditor and her only child. No marital rights of a husband are
invoked, and the child does not claim property derived from a wife,
but from a widow. The facts are so essentially different that the
rule declared in King's Appeal does not apply. We adhere to the
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correctness of that ruling whenever applicable. To strain the
principle there declared so as to control the present case, would do
violence to its spirit and defeat the humane provisions of the statute.
The learned judge was clearly right in distinguishing that case from
the present, and committed no error in ordering the property to be
set off to the minor child."
In Wanger's Appeal, 105 Pa. 346 (1884), King's Appeal, supra, and
Hime' Appeal, supra, were distinguished in a case where the widow acquired
land by devise from her husband, the land being subject to the lien of certain
debts of the deceased husband. Later the widow died leaving a minor child
who claimed the $300 exemption out of the land as the property of his mother.
In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court thus explained:
"The learned judge made the proper distinction between King's
Appeal, 3 Norris, 345, and Himes' Appeal, 13 Id. 381. In the
former case the contention was between the surviving husband on
the one side, and the children of his deceased wife on the other
side. The attempt was to take from him property of his wife which
the statute expressly gave him. We declared the Act did not intend
to apply to the property of a wife. In the latter case the question
did not relate to the distribution of the property of a wife, but to
the property of a widow. The rights of a husband did not arise.
It follows so far as that part of the case is presented this decree is
right, and the court was also right in holding that the land passed to
the mother 'encumbered by the liens with which it was charged
when she acquired it. There was error in allowing any interest on
the judgment in favor of the appellee, Peirce. The auditor allowed none. No exception was taken to this decision. The court
gives no reason for the allowance. It was evidently inadvertently
made. To the extent of the sum allowed for interest the decree
must be modified."
In AlcKeen v. Ehret, 31 C. C. 142 (1905), SCHUYLER, P. J. of the
Orphans' Court of Northampton County, held that the minor child of a deceased
mother, whose husband had signed articles of separation releasing any rights in
his wife's estate, was entitled to claim the exemption under the Act of April 14,
1851, the learned court thus commenting:
"We think the point raised by the case-stated is ruled by Himes'
Ap., 94 Pa. 381. True, in that case the decedent was a widow,
while in the case at bar she was a wife. It is also true that in King's
Ap., 84 Pa. 345, it is decided that the children of a deceased wife
are not entitled to an exemption out of her estate, on the ground
that to allow the exemption would be in contravention of the hus-
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band's rights under the intestate laws. But here the husband
parted with all his said rights by a release to his wife which leaves
the present case in principle on all fours with Himes' Appeal."
On the other hand in the Estate of Ella M. Goetz, deceased, Vol. 32, page
527 of the Orphans' Court Records of Franklin County (1906), Judge GILLAN
decided that a minor child of a deceased mother was not entitled to the exemption where she left surviving as her heirs at law her husband, with whom she
was living at the time of her death, and five children, four of whom were
married and one unmarried. It was the unmarried daughter, Harriet, who was
a minor living with her mother at the time of the latter's death and the claimant
for the exemption. Said the learned judge:
"It must not be forgotten that the minor who claims the benefit of
the Act of Assembly is the only one of these children of whom the
surviving husband is the father. He is legally bound for her support. While it is true that if this appraisement is confirmed it will
reduce the amount which the father would receive from his wife's
estate; it is equally true that it will help his child to the detriment
of those children of whom he is not the father. If the property
left by the wife was real estate it vests in all the children in equal
proportions subject to the father's life estate. If it was personal
property it vests in the husband and the children in equal proportions. If the property is now allowed to go to his minor child it
may benefit him more than he will be benefited by depriving the
child of it and allowing him to have his portion under the Intestate
laws. Again, he is not bound to appear in Court and protect his
interests. It nowhere appears that he has any notice of this proceeding and he has a right to expect his wife's estate to be distributed according to law without his presence in Court. Moreover, no authority has been brought to our notice which holds that
a child of a wife living with her husband has ever been allowed the
benefits of the Act of Assembly, or that the doctrine of King's
Appeal, above cited, has ever been departed from. While it is
true that in Himes' Appeal, above cited, there was no evidence of
the husband's actual death; yet he had been absent and not heard
of for more than seven years, and tht Court all through the opinion
speaks of the decedent as a widow.
"Again in Wanger's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 349, the Supreme Court,
in speaking of King's Appeal, says: 'We declared the Act did not
intend to apply to the property of a wife.'
"There is nothing in McKean vs. Ehret in conflict with this, and if
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there were we could not, in face of what the Supreme Court has
said on the subject, allow it to guide us in reaching a conclusion.
"It follows, therefore, that the exceptions must be sustained."
It appears from the above authorities to be settled law that children of a
deceased mother may, if they are otherwise qualified by law to take, be entitled
to the exemption out of the deceased mother's estate provided there is no husban.d and father surviving. As to McKeen v. Ehret, supra, the reasoning contaired therein is at variance with that of Judge GILLAN in the Estate of Ella
M. Goetz. It would appear that these two cases are in conflict and that the
reas;oning of Judge Gillan presents the better line of thought in this class of
cases.
Concerning the status of grandchildren living with the grandparents and
where there are no children of the grandparents involved, the question has been
mooted whether the words "child or children" in the exemption provision may
be interpreted under the above facts to include grandchildren. The matter is
not touched upon in the Statutory Construction Act of 1937, P. L. 1019, but in
the decisions on testamentary interpretations it has been usually determined that
the words "child or children" do not include grandchildren unless the broader
meaning can be gathered from the context. Grubb's Est., 263 Pa. 468 (1919)
106 A. 787. See also Words and Phrases, sub nomine.
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